This paper analyzes the way in which the earnings of the immigrant population may be expected to differ from the earnings of the native population because of the endogeneity of the decision to migrate. The empirical study shows that differences in the U.S. earnings of immigrants with the same measured skills, but from different home countries, are attributable to variations in political and economic conditions in the countries of origin at the time of migration.
analysis suggests), what factors are responsible for this change in the selection mechanism determining immigration?
This paper presents a theoretical and empirical study of these questions. It is assumed that individuals compare the potential incomes in the United States with the incomes in the home countries, and make the migration decision based on these income differentials (net of mobility costs). The use of this standard model allows a systematic analysis of the types of selection biases that are created by this behavior.2 It will be seen that the common assumption that immigrants are drawn from the upper tail of the "home" income distribution requires a set of conditions that will not be generally satisfied. More importantly, this type of model suggests a few key variables (namely, the characteristics of the relevant income distributions) that "predict" the types of selection biases created by incomemaximizing behavior on the part of potential migrants.
The empirical work presented in this paper analyzes the U.S. earnings of immigrants from forty-one countries using the 1970 and 1980 censuses. Not surprisingly, it is found that the variance in (relative) immigrant earnings across these countries is substantial. Using the theoretical insights, however, the analysis shows that the variance in various measures of the "quality" of immigrants can be explained to a large extent by a few key variables describing economic and political conditions in the countries of origin. The parameter ,ul is the mean income that residents from the home country would earn in the United States if all home country citizens were to migrate to the United States. In general, this level of income need not be the same as that of the U.S. native population since the average skills of the two populations-even in the absence of selection 2 The model is formally identical to that presented in A. D. Roy's (1951) study of the impact of self-selection in occupational choice on the income distribution. The wealth-maximization hypothesis is also the cornerstone of the human capital model by Larry Sjaastad (1962). However, both Sjaastad's work and the literature it engendered pay little attention to the selection biases that are at the core of the Roy model. 3Two important problems are ignored by the twocountry setup. First, it is likely that potential movers from any country j will have more than one possible country of destination, Second, the probability that U.S. native-born persons emigrate to other countries may not be negligible. These possibilities are ignored in order to focus on the essential aspects of the selection problem. 4The Roy model has been recently used by Robert Willis and Sherwin Rosen (1979) to analyze the types of selection biases created by the college attendance decision. Heckman and Guilherme Sedlacek (1985) present a generalization of the Roy model and apply it to the problem of estimating market wage functions. biases-may differ. For simplicity, in the remainder of the discussion it is assumed that these intercountry differences in skill (such as education and age) have been standardized, and hence 1,, also gives the earnings of the average native worker in the United States.5
The migration decision for persons in country 0 is determined by the sign of the index function: and 4> is the standard normal distribution function. Equation (4) neatly summarizes the economic content of the theory of migration proposed by Larry Sjaastad. If follows from (4) that the emigration rate is: (a) a negative function of mean income in the home country; (b) a positive function of mean income in the United States; and (c) a negative function of the costs of emigrating to the United States. There are, however, a number of other implications in the theory that yield important insights into the kinds of selection biases generated by the endogenous migration decision. In particular, consider the conditional means E(ln woI I> 0) and E(ln wI > 0). The first of these means gives the average earnings of emigrants in the country of origin, while the latter term gives the average earnings of these migrants in the United States. Under the normality assumptions these conditional means are given by where X = O(z)/P; and 4 is the density of the standard normal. The variable A is inversely related to the emigration rate, and takes on a value of zero when P = 1 (James Heckman, 1979) . Assume initially that P < 1 so that at least part of the home country's population is better off by not emigrating. Then the second terms in (5) and (6) define the kinds of selection biases generated by income-maximizing behavior. Equation (5) shows that the average emigrant may be " better" or " worse" off than the average person in the country of origin depending on p < ao/a,. Similarly, equation ( Case 1: Positive Selection: QO > 0 and Q1 > 0. In this situation the "best" persons leave the country of origin and when they get to the United States, they outperform the native population. A reading of the literature on the earnings of immigrants suggests that 5It is possible, of course, that the average person in country 0 has ethnic or racial characteristics which are favored or penalized by the U.S. labor market. Hence the mean income of (equally skilled) natives may not equal tL. This possibility is ignored in the discussion that follows, but it can be easily incorporated into the model.
6A fourth case where QO > 0 and Q1 < 0 is theoretically impossible since it requires p > 1. this positive selection is most often assumed in the interpretation of those empirical results. Inspection of equations (5) and (6), however, shows that the necessary (and sufficient) conditions for positive selection to occur are (7) p > min(1/k, k) and k > 1.
Thus if p is sufficiently high and, if income is more dispersed in the United States than in the country of origin, the immigrants arriving in the United States are indeed selected from the upper tail of the home country's income distribution and will outperform the native born. Negative selection again requires that p be "sufficiently" positive but that the income distribution be more unequal in the home country that in the United States.7
Case 3: Refugee Sorting: QO < 0 and Q1 > 0. The United States draws below-average immigrants (in terms of the country of origin), but they outperform the U.S. native born upon arrival. The necessary (and sufficient) condition for this to occur is (9) p<min(l/k,k).
These three cases summarize the quality differentials between migrants and the native base in each of the two countries. It seems plausible to argue that for non-Communist countries, p is likely to be positive and large. After all, profit-maximizing employers are likely to value the same factors in any market economy. The quality of immigrants in the United States then depends entirely on the ratio of variances in the income distributions of the United States and the country of origin. Suppose, for example, that a0 > a2. The United States, in a sense, "insures" low-income workers against poor labor market outcomes while "taxing" high-income workers (relative to the country of origin). This opportunity set implies that lowincome workers have much greater incentives to migrate than high-income workers, and thus leads to immigrants being negatively selected from the population. Conversely, if a2 > a2, the home country now protects low-income workers from poor labor market outcomes and taxes the high-income worker. This opportunity set generates a "brain drain" into the United States. Available data on the distribution of income (World Bank, 1986, pp. 226-27) suggests that income is more unequally distributed in the large number of Third World countries (for example, Mexico, India, etc.) which form the bulk of current immigration to the United States.8 Income-maximizing behavior is inconsistent with the traditional assumption that the United States draws the "best" workers from a given country and that those workers will (eventually) outperform the U.S. native born.
On the other hand, p need not always be positive and strong. It is likely, in fact, that p is negative for countries that have recently experienced a Communist takeover. The change from a market economy to a Communist system is often accompanied by 7The generalization of the model to allow for variable mobility costs (q,) shows that the necessary conditions for negative (positive) selection remain unchanged as long as mobility costs and earnings do not have an "excessive" negative (positive) correlation. In addition, the impact of variable mobility costs on the results of the analysis is negligible if the variance in mobility costs is small relative to the variance in the income distributions. 8It must be noted, however, that these data on income inequality do not correspond exactly to the variances that are the primitive parameters of the Roy model. In particular, q,2 and a2 describe the dispersion in "opportunities" (for a given socioeconomic characteristics). structural shifts in the income distribution and, in particular, the confiscation of the financial holdings of entrepreneurs. Immigrants from such systems will be in the lower tail of the "revolutionary" income distribution but will outperform the average U.S. native worker. This result signals the movement of persons who cannot match with the new political structure, but who "seek refuge" and match quite well in a market economy.
These insights are developed under the assumption that selection biases do exist (i.e., P< 1 and X>O). Since for most countries in Latin America and Asia the mean level of the U.S. income distribution greatly exceeds the mean level of the home country's income distribution, it is unclear why-in the context of an income-maximizing model-the entire population of country 0 does not emigrate to the United States.
There are two reasons why we do not observe wholesale migrations of entire populations to the United States. First, it is not the differences in mean income levels that determine the extent of migration, but the differences in mean income levels net of migration costs. These migration costs will be both monetary and psychic, and are likely to be large in countries that have different cultural and social backgrounds than the United States. Second, there are statutory restrictions on the number of legal immigrants the United States will accept from any given country. These quotas play the important role of increasing migration costs of emigrants (if the numerical constraints are binding), since these individuals will presumably have to compete (and invest time and effort) to obtain the relatively scarce visas. Hence mobility costs ensure that only some persons in country 0 find it worthwhile to emigrate and thereby create the selection biases that are apparent in immigration data.
The model outlined above can be used to infer how the quality of immigrants in the United States will differ in the cross section In addition, a change in a0 changes the rate of emigration. Equation (13) shows that the sign of the scale effect depends on the sign of three terms: (k -p), (1 -pk), and z.
The first two of these terms are nothing but the restrictions in equations (7) and (8). Suppose, for concreteness, that there is negative selection: the least-able persons leave the home country and they perform below the U.S. native average. This implies k -p < 0 and 1-pk> 0. Inspection of (13) reveals that the direction of the scale effect depends on the sign of z=-(p1-u0-7T)/av. If y > /o + 'r, so that mean U.S. incomes are higher than foreign incomes even after adjusting for mobility costs, z is negative, the scale effect is negative, and thus immigrants from countries with more income inequality will perform worse in the United States.
The intuition for the workings of the scale effect can be grasped by considering Figure  1 , which is drawn with z < 0 and a1 < ao. As a0 increases, the worst-off persons in country 0 will still want to migrate, while the better-off persons become relatively better 10This discussion illustrates how differences in skill characteristics can enter the Roy model. More generally, the earnings distributions in the two countries can be written as lnwo=X80+eo, lnw1=X81+El, and the emigration rate (for given characteristics X) is given by
Selection will occur not only on the basis of unobserved characteristics (?), but also in terms of the socioeconomic variables X as long as the two countries value these skills differently. Although the empirical analysis below (by holding X constant) focuses on the selections in e, it would be very interesting to also investigate the types of selections generated in X. (1-pk)X dp UV
Changes in the correlation coefficient also induce two effects. Consider first the composition effect. Its sign depends on -(1 -pk), which is negative if there is negative selection. An increase in p implies that a better match exists between performance in the United States and in the home country. Since a0 > al this decreases the profitability of migration for the best persons in country 0 and increases it for the worst persons. In addition, changes in p have an impact on the emigration rate, and the scale effect is given by the last term in (14). If the conditions for negative selection hold, k -p < 0 and the sign of the scale effect will depend on the sign of -z. If, as before, we assume z < 0, the scale effect of an increase in the correlation coefficient on the quality of immigrants is seen to be positive.
A summary of the comparative statics results under the various regimes is provided in Table 1 
II. Empirical Framework
The quality measure Q1 derived in the previous section is the standardized wage differential between immigrants and natives "1In addition, the 1965 Act changed the emphasis in the allocation of visas toward family reunification and away from occupational preferences. This shift may well lead to an even steeper decline in the quality of immigrants admitted to the United States. 12The parameters fIB and /2 capture two kinds of cohort effects: 1) differences in the skill composition of cohorts due to a secular trend in the quality of immigrants; and 2) differences due to selective emigration of foreign-born persons in the United States. Little is known, however, about the selection biases associated with return migration even though the Roy model can be generalized to account for the possibility that individuals make "mistakes." Unfortunately, U.S. data on the return migration of foreign-born persons is basically nonexistent, and hence this problem is ignored in what follows.
13Except perhaps for the coefficient of the immigrant dummy. This coefficient gives the wage differential between the most recent cohort of immigrants and the native-born population.
14 Provided that period effects on the immigrantnative wage differential are negligible. This assumption is far from innocuous. 3, a,, a2, 1, and   12 ). From these estimates it is possible to calculate measures of three alternative dimensions of cohort quality that underlie the discussion. The first of these dimensions is simply the wage of an immigrant cohort relative to the native base prior to any assimilation taking place; that is, a measure of the "raw" skills a given immigrant cohort brings to the United States. A second dimension is given by the extent to which the quality of successive immigrant cohorts is changing over time, while a third dimension is given by the extent to which the earnings of a specific immigrant cohort grow-above and beyond pure aging effects-in the U.S. labor market. Clearly, there are many ways of defining variables that capture these three facets of the "quality" of immigrants. However, since all possible definitions of a particular dimension of quality are based on the same underlying parameters, there is a high degree of correlation among the alternative measures. Thus, to some extent, the choice of the empirical representation of a given facet of quality is arbitrary. In the empirical analysis below, the three dimensions of quality are defined by 1) The predicted wage differential in 1979 between the most recently arrived immigrant cohort and the native base. This measure of the quality of a single cohort of immigrants-prior to assimilation taking place-is given by the coefficient of the immigrant dummy variable in the 1980 cross section.
2) The rate of wage growth (relative to natives) for an immigrant cohort that has resided in the United States for ten years. This is the assimilation effect evaluated at y = 10, and is given bya ln w/dyjY=IO = a1 + 20a2.
3) The predicted wage differential immediately after immigration between the 1979 cohort and the 1955 cohort. This measure of the extent of cohort-quality change is designed to compare the typical immigrant that migrated prior to the 1965 Immigration and Nationality Act with the typical immigrant from the most recent wave. Using equation (15) ing of the cross-section profile implies that the quality of French immigrants increased over the sample period.
Three dimensions of cohort quality are implicit in these regression coefficients. The entry wage differential between the 1979 immigrant cohort and the native base is given by the coefficient of the immigrant dummy in the 1980 census cross section. Table 3 clearly shows that this coefficient has a large variance across countries. The last two columns of Table 3 present estimates of the other two dimensions of cohort quality: the assimilation rate defined by the slope of the earnings-assimilation path at y = 10; and the rate of change in cohort quality, defined by the earnings differential between the 1979 cohort and the 1955 cohort at the time of arrival in the United States. Since these estimated parameters are functions of the cross-section coefficients of Table 3 , it is not surprising to find that there is a lot of variance in both of these variables across countries. Immigrants from some countries have high assimilation rates, while immigrants from other countries experience no assimilation at all. Similarly, the rate of cohortquality change is sometimes positive (thus indicating quality increased between the 1955 and 1979 cohorts) and sometimes negative (thus indicating a quality decrease across cohorts). For example, the most recent immigrant wave from the United Kingdom has an earnings potential that is about 13 percent higher that the wave that arrived in 1955, while the most recent immigrants from India have 28 percent lower earnings than the earlier cohort.
The Roy model suggests that countryspecific characteristics of the income distribution (and mobility costs) determine the quality of immigrants in the United States. The important task, therefore, becomes the identification of observable variables which can proxy for these theoretical parameters, and the determination of whether these country-specific variables "explain" the variance in the quality proxies presented in Table 3. Table 4 The country-specific vector also includes variables that describe economic conditions in the various countries of origin:
IV. Determinants of Immigrant Quality
1) The logarithm of per capita Gross National Product in 1980 (in U.S. dollars). In addition, the analysis also uses the average annual percentage change in that variable over the 1963-80 period. These variables, of course, are designed to control for the mean level of the income distribution (as well as changes in that level) in the various countries of origin. 20There is also the possibility that a country gained its freedom during the 1950-73 period. Only one country, however, falls in this category (the Dominican Republic). To reduce the number of exogenous variables, this country was pooled with the countries that were "free" throughout the entire period. 2) The ratio of household income accruing to the top 10 percent of the households to the income accruing to the bottom 20 percent of the households (circa 1970). Unfortunately, this measure of income inequality does not exist prior to the 1970's for most of the countries under analysis, and hence the change in the extent of income inequality during the last three decades cannot be documented. The empirical analysis below will proxy for the change in income inequality by using the change in the fraction of GNP that can be attributed to central government expenditures over that period.
Presumably, the greater the role of the government the more taxation and income redistribution that occurs, and hence the less unequal the income distribution will be.
3) The level of mobility costs is proxied by the number of air miles between the country's capital and the nearest U.S. gateway.
Finally, the regressions also include variables that describe relevant characteristics of the immigrant population itself. The two variables in this category are the fraction of the most recently arrived immigrants who speak English well or very well, and the average age at migration. These variables are likely to affect the earnings of immigrants as well as their incentives to invest in human capital, and hence will be important determinants of immigrant quality.
A. Determinants of the Entry Wage Differential
In the last section a variable measuring the entry wage differential between the foreign born and the native born for the immigrant cohort arriving in 1979 was calculated for each of the 41 countries under analysis. Table 5 presents the generalized least squares regressions of this measure of immigrant quality on the country-specific aggregate variables.2"
The simplest specification in column 1 shows that the variable measuring whether or not the country was politically competitive in the postwar period has a strong positive impact on the immigrant's entry wage. Immigrants from these countries have 27 percent higher relative earnings (at the time of entry into the United States) than immigrants from politically repressive countries. This basic regression also shows that the extent of income inequality has a weak negative impact on the relative quality of immigrants. Immigrants from countries with more income inequality are of lower quality. This result is consistent with the theoretical implications of the Roy model. As income inequality increases, the migration incentives for persons in the upper tail of the distribution decline, thus lowering the average quality of the immigrant population.
In column 2 of Table 5 , the variables measuring mobility costs and the age and English proficiency of immigrants are added to the regression. The results suggest that persons migrating from countries that have 100 percent English proficiency rates have about 26 percent higher relative earnings at the time of entry than immigrants from countries with 0 percent English proficiency rates.22 Table 5 also shows that age at migration has a significant negative impact on the initial relative earnings of immigrants in the United States. Hence persons who migrate as youths have an easier time in the U.S. labor market than older immigrants.
The third regression in Table 5 immigrants by about 1.2 percent. This effect is likely to be caused by the fact that the higher the GNP in the country of origin, the greater the resemblance between that country's economic structure and that of the United States, as well as the greater the skills of the immigrant flow. Hence immigrants from those countries perform quite well in the U.S. labor market. The last regression in Table 6 adds continent dummies (the omitted continent is Europe) to control for continent-specific fixed effects. These additional controls do not have a major impact on the coefficient of the other variables.23 Table 5 shows that controlling for variations in per capita GNP across countries of origin has a major impact on the coefficient of the inequality variable: the latter turns positive (and insignificant). The reason for this shift lies in the very high negative correlation between the two variables (r = -.6).
Since high-income countries (mostly in Western Europe) also tend to have the least amount of income inequality, the impact of per capita GNP on initial immigrant quality is likely capturing shifts in both the mean and the variance of the country of origin's income distribution.
The results in Table 5 , therefore, are not entirely consistent with the theoretical predictions. Note, however, that these regressions do not truly constitute a "test" of the theory. The Roy model shows that selection biases will depend on a number of parameters which are not directly measurable. Table  5 attempts to explain intercountry differences in terms of variables which sup23To further test the sensitivity of the results, two additional variables were introduced into the regression: the percent of the country's labor force that is in agriculture, and the per capita school enrollment rate. Both of these variables were highly correlated with GNP per capita, and in fact became insignificant once GNP was controlled for. Their impact on the other variables in the regression was negligible. posedly proxy for these primitive concepts. Clearly the errors introduced in the creation of these variables weaken the link between the theory and the empirical work. Nevertheless, it is important to note that these few country-specific variables "explain" a large fraction of the intercountry differences evident in census data.
B. Determinants of the Rate of Assimilation
The assimilation rate is defined by the rate of earnings growth of an immigrant cohort (relative to natives) evaluated at ten years after immigration. Table 6 presents the regressions of this variable on the various country-specific proxies.
Assimilation rates are determined by political factors. In particular, immigrants from free countries have lower assimilation rates than immigrants from countries with a long history of political repression, while immigrants from countries that recently lost their political freedom have the highest assimilation rates. These results are consistent with the hypothesis that the costs of return migration for immigrants from politically repressive countries are high, and therefore they have the most incentives to adapt to the U.S. labor market. The same reasoning can also explain the strong positive impact of the number of assassinations on the rate of immigrant assimilation: immigrants from politically unstable countries have greater incentives to assimilate in the U.S. labor market since their return migration may be costly.
The regression in column 2 shows that although distance between the United States and the country of birth has a positive impact on the assimilation rate, the effect is not significant. However, immigrants from countries with higher levels of English proficiency have much higher assimilation rates. In fact, the rate of earnings growth of immigrants from English-speaking countries is 1.4 percentage points higher than that of im- migrants from countries with 0 percent English proficiency rates. Similarly, the age at immigration has a strong positive impact on assimilation rates. This result is consistent with the hypothesis that immigrants who migrate as youths have little to gain from assimilation per se. On the other hand, the adaptation period is likely to be important for persons who migrate at older ages. The last two regressions in Table 6 include per capita GNP variable and the continent dummies in the list of regressors. These variables have a significant impact on the assimilation rate (in column 4). Immigrants from wealthier countries have higher assimilation rates, and Europeans (the omitted continent) have higher assimilation rates than immigrants from the Americas, but lower assimilation rates than inumigrants born in Asia or Africa. Despite the strongly significant impact of the continent dummies, the qualitative effect of most of the other variables in the regression is unaffected.
C. Determinants of the Change in Cohort Quality
Section III calculated a variable measuring the wage differential between the 1979 immigrant cohort and the 1955 immigrant cohort as of the date of immigration. The regressions analyzing the determinants of cohort quality change are presented in Table  7 . It should be noted that the specification of these regressions differs slightly from those presented in Tables 5 and 6 since cohort quality change is likely to be determined by changes in the explanatory variables over the 1954-79 period.
The simple specification in column 1 reveals that cohort quality change is strongly influenced by practically all the variables in the regressions. For example, the quality of cohorts from countries that experienced a shift from political competition to repression increased by about 13 percent (relative to the quality of cohorts from countries that were politically repressive throughout the period). This effect is consistent with the implications of the theory developed in Section I. The change in political structure can be viewed as a change in the correlation coefficient of the earnings of individuals between the home country and the United States. The change toward a repressive government may make the correlation coefficient in earnings across the two countries negative. Thus persons in the "revolutionary" lower tail of the home country's income distribution migrate to the United States and perform quite well in the U.S. labor market. Table 7 also shows that cohort quality change is strongly affected by the average annual change in the percent of GNP that is attributable to expenditures by the central government. Presumably the greater the role of the government, the more income redistribution that takes place and the greater the decrease in income inequality over the postwar period. The coefficient of this variable in Table 8 is consistent with the theoretical implication.
The next two regressions in Table 8 add the level of per capita GNP to control for country-specific differences in wealth, and the continent dummies to control for continent-specific fixed effects. The continent dummies are not very significant, but per capita GNP variable does have a strong positive impact on cohort-quality change. Its positive coefficient confirms the finding suggested by the descriptive analysis in Section III: the quality of immigrants admitted to the United States has been increasing over time when the immigrants originate in Western Europe and has been declining over time when the immigrants originate in the less developed countries. One factor causing systematic quality shifts across immigrant cohorts may have been the change in the quota system mandated by the 1965 Amendments to the Immigration and Nationality Act. Table 4 defined a variable that measures the change in the fraction of the home country's population "eligible" for emigration to the United States before and after the 1965 Amendments. Higher levels of this variable imply a reduction in the levels of "mobility costs" faced by potential emigrants. The Roy model suggests that its impact on the rate of cohort-quality change is positive if the correlation coefficient between earnings capacities in the two countries is positive and if income is more unequally distributed in the countries of origin than in the United States. The last column of Table 7 adds the quota variable to the regression and shows that it indeed has a positive and significant impact on the rate of change in cohort quality. It is important to note that this regression is estimated on only 28 observations since the quota system prior to the 1965 Amendments was applicable only to countries that were in the Eastern Hemisphere.
D. Determinants of the Emigration Rate
The empirical analysis in this paper focuses on the determinants of the (relative) earnings of immigrants. It is worth noting, however, that the Roy model also implies that the emigration rate will be a function of the same characteristics of the income distribution, political conditions, and migration costs that determine the relative earnings of immigrants. Therefore, it is important to explore if the emigration rate from the various countries of origin is responsive to shifts in the country-specific variables that have been used throughout this section. Table 8 presents two probit regressions on the emigration rate.24 The dependent variable is obtained from the second column of the summary statistics presented in Table 2 , and is the fraction of the country of origin's population that emigrated to the United States in the 1951-80 period. The first of the two regressions includes the political variables, the distance variable (to measure migration costs), and the inequality variable, while the second regression adds the continent dummies.25
As expected, the distance between the country of origin and the United States has a negative impact on the emigration rate. The emigration rate is also lower for countries that have high levels of GNP per capita. These results, of course, are consistent with the predictions of the wealth-maximization framework. More interestingly, the second moment of the income distribution (as predicted by the Roy model) plays an important role in the determination of the emigration rate. In particular, countries with more income inequality have lower emigration rates. This negative coefficient is implied by the wealth-maximization framework if there is negative selection in the immigrant pool. Negative selection requires that the correlation between earnings in the United States and in the sending countries be sufficiently positive and that the United States has less income inequality than the sending countries. If, in addition, mean income in the United States exceeds mean income in sending countries (adjusted for mobility costs), as income inequality in the home country increases, the migration incentives of the most able decreases while the poorest will still migrate. Hence the emigration rate declines due to the withdrawal of high-income persons from the pool of emigrants. The analysis of the emigration rate, therefore, leads to results that are generally consistent with the types of selection biases that have been documented in this paper.
V. Summary
What determines the (labor market) quality of foreign-born persons in the United States? Most of the literature addresses this question simply by assuming that immigrants are a "select" group, and that the selection mechanism somehow sends the most able and the most ambitious persons in any country of origin to the United States. This paper is an attempt to analyze both the conceptual and empirical foundations for this type of assertion. Among the major findings of the study are: 1) If potential emigrants are income maximizers, foreign-born persons in the United States need not be drawn from the most able and most ambitious in the country of origin. Two conditions must be satisfied in order for positive selection to take place: a) there is a strong positive correlation between the earnings a worker may expect in the home country and the earnings the same worker may expect in the United States; and 24The probits were estimated using generalized least squares. The estimator, therefore, is minimum chisquared and efficient. 25 The regressions in Table 8 exclude the age at migration from the list of regressors since this variable was calculated in the subsample of immigrants and may have little relationship to the age distribution of the population in the country of origin. b) the United States has a more unequal income distribution than the home country. If the income distribution in the sending country is more unequal than that of the United States (and the correlation in earnings is positive and strong), emigrants will be chosen from the lower tail of the income distribution in the country of origin.
2) The empirical analysis of the earnings of immigrants from 41 different countries using the 1970 and 1980 censuses shows that there are strong country-specific fixed effects in the (labor market) quality of foreign-born persons. In particular, persons from Western European countries do quite well in the United States, and their cohorts have exhibited a general increase in earnings (relative to their measured skills) over the postwar period. On the other hand, persons from less developed countries do not perform well in the U.S. labor market and their cohorts have exhibited a general decrease in earnings (relative to their measured skills) over the postwar period.
3) The empirical analysis of the variance in various dimensions of immigrant incomes shows that a few variables describing political and economic conditions in the various countries of origin explain over twothirds of the intercountry variance in the mean U.S. incomes of immigrants with the same measured skills. Immigrants with high incomes in the United States relative to their measured skills come from countries that have high levels of GNP, low levels of income inequality, and politically competitive systems.
